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Adaptive and aberrant reward prediction signals in the human
brain
Abstract
Theories of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia hypothesize a role for aberrant reinforcement
signaling driven by dysregulated dopamine transmission. Recently, we provided evidence of aberrant
reward learning in symptomatic, but not asymptomatic patients with schizophrenia, using a novel
paradigm, the Salience Attribution Test (SAT). The SAT is a probabilistic reward learning game that
employs cues that vary across task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions; it provides behavioral
indices of adaptive and aberrant reward learning. As an initial step prior to future clinical studies, here
we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural basis of adaptive and aberrant
reward learning during the SAT in healthy volunteers. As expected, cues associated with high relative to
low reward probabilities elicited robust hemodynamic responses in a network of structures previously
implicated in motivational salience; the midbrain, in the vicinity of the ventral tegmental area, and
regions targeted by its dopaminergic projections, i.e. medial dorsal thalamus, ventral striatum and
prefrontal cortex (PFC). Responses in the medial dorsal thalamus and polar PFC were strongly
correlated with the degree of adaptive reward learning across participants. Finally, and most
importantly, differential dorsolateral PFC and middle temporal gyrus (MTG) responses to cues with
identical reward probabilities were very strongly correlated with the degree of aberrant reward learning.
Participants who showed greater aberrant learning exhibited greater dorsolateral PFC responses, and
reduced MTG responses, to cues erroneously inferred to be less strongly associated with reward. The
results are discussed in terms of their implications for different theories of associative learning.
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ABSTRACT 
Theories of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia hypothesise a role for aberrant 
reinforcement signalling driven by dysregulated dopamine transmission. Recently, we 
provided evidence of aberrant reward learning in symptomatic, but not asymptomatic 
patients with schizophrenia, using a novel paradigm, the Salience Attribution Test (SAT). 
The SAT is a probabilistic reward learning game that employs cues that vary across task-
relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions; it provides behavioural indices of adaptive and 
aberrant reward learning. As an initial step prior to future clinical studies, here we used 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine the neural basis of adaptive and 
aberrant reward learning during the SAT in healthy volunteers. As expected, cues 
associated with high relative to low reward probabilities elicited robust hemodynamic 
responses in a network of structures previously implicated in motivational salience; the 
midbrain, in the vicinity of the ventral tegmental area, and regions targeted by its 
dopaminergic projections, i.e. medial dorsal thalamus, ventral striatum and prefrontal 
cortex (PFC). Responses in the medial dorsal thalamus and polar PFC were strongly 
correlated with the degree of adaptive reward learning across participants. Finally, and 
most importantly, differential dorsolateral PFC and middle temporal gyrus (MTG) 
responses to cues with identical reward probabilities were very strongly correlated with 
the degree of aberrant reward learning. Participants who showed greater aberrant learning 
exhibited greater dorsolateral PFC responses, and reduced MTG responses, to cues 
erroneously inferred to be less strongly associated with reward. The results are discussed 
in terms of their implications for different theories of associative learning.
 3
Roiser et al. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that mesolimbic dopamine transmission mediates the processes by 
which: (i) reinforcement learning occurs (Schultz et al., 1997; Tsai et al., 2009) and (ii) 
conditioned stimuli come to drive goal-directed behavior (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). 
A number of theorists have suggested that the spurious learning of contingencies between 
events that in fact co-occur only coincidentally might be related to dysregulated 
dopamine transmission (King et al., 1984; Gray et al., 1991; Shaner, 1999). This process 
has been hypothesised to contribute to the development of abnormal beliefs in psychotic 
disorders such as schizophrenia (see Corlett et al., 2007 for a review), which is associated 
with both dopaminergic abnormalities (Abi-Dargham, 2004) and reinforcement-learning 
deficits (Waltz et al., 2007; Waltz and Gold, 2007). Integrating such findings with 
phenomenological accounts of psychosis, Kapur (2003) proposed the ‘aberrant salience’ 
hypothesis of psychosis, which explicitly links the aberrant signalling of motivational 
salience by dysregulated dopamine transmission to psychotic symptoms.  
We recently provided the first evidence directly supporting the aberrant salience 
hypothesis using a novel behavioural paradigm, the Salience Attribution Test (SAT; 
Roiser et al., 2009). The SAT is a probabilistic reward learning task featuring compound 
cue stimuli that vary along two dimensions, one task-relevant and one task-irrelevant. 
‘Adaptive’ reward learning refers to differences in ratings (the explicit measure of 
learning) and reaction times (the implicit measure of learning) along the task-relevant cue 
dimension, i.e. for high-probability reward cue features relative to low-probability reward 
cue features. ‘Aberrant’ reward learning is defined similarly, but along the task-irrelevant 
dimension, i.e. differences in ratings or reaction times between cue features that are both 
associated with 50% probability of reward. In our previous behavioural study, we found 
that schizophrenia patients with delusions scored significantly higher than those without 
delusions on our measures of aberrant learning. 
Prior to future neurophysiological studies of patients with psychotic symptoms 
employing the SAT, we wished to investigate the neural mechanisms mediating adaptive 
and aberrant reward learning in healthy volunteers, Using functional magnetic resonance 
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imaging (fMRI) predicted that (i) adaptive reward prediction signals (i.e. neural 
responses to high-probability reward cue features relative to low-probability reward cue 
features) would be reflected in hemodynamic responses in cortico-striatal-thalamic 
circuitry innervated by dopamine and previously implicated in reward processing; in 
particular the medial dorsal (MD) thalamus, ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
(Brown et al., 1979; Alexander et al., 1986; Voorn et al., 1986; Oades and Halliday, 
1987; Schultz et al., 1997; Knutson et al., 2004; Sanchez-Gonzalez et al., 2005; Garcia-
Cabezas et al., 2007). We further predicted that (ii) aberrant reward prediction signals 
(i.e. differential neural responses to two different categories of cue features associated 
with identical reward probabilities) would be reflected in hemodynamic responses in 
separate but partially overlapping circuits, particularly in the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC), 
which is hypothesized to play a central role in the optimization of stimulus-reward 
associations and resulting behaviour (Montague et al., 2004; Grace et al., 2007). 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Twenty-three right-handed healthy volunteers, nineteen of whom were included in the 
final analysis (average age 27 years (SD 6.5 years); average IQ 102 (SD 8.8)) were 
recruited by advertisement. Exclusion criteria were: known psychiatric or neurological 
disorder; medical disorder likely to lead to cognitive impairment; IQ<70; recent illicit 
substance use and first-degree relatives diagnosed with a psychotic illness. The absence 
of Axis-I psychopathology and alcohol- or substance-abuse/dependence was confirmed 
with the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory (MINI: Sheehan et al., 1998). IQ 
was estimated using four sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised 
(Blyler et al., 2000). 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Ealing & West London Mental Health Trust and 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery & Institute of Neurology Research 
Ethics Committees. All participants provided written informed consent, were 
compensated £40 for their participation and could win up to another £20 on the SAT. 
Salience Attribution Test (Figure 1; Roiser et al., 2009) 
Task structure 
The SAT, which included a standardized tutorial performed outside the scanner to 
familiarize participants with the game, has been described previously (Roiser et al., 2009; 
Figure 1). On each trial, participants had to make a speeded response to the onset of a 
probe (a white square) in order to earn money, with more money earned for quicker 
responses. Prior to the main game, participants performed a practice session in the 
scanner, with no rewards and no cues, on which they were simply required to respond as 
quickly as possible to the onset of the probe. From this practice session each participant’s 
mean reaction time (RT) and standard deviation of the ten fastest trials (SDF) was 
calculated in order to calibrate task difficulty on a participant-by-participant basis (see 
below).  
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On the main game, monetary reward was available on 50% of trials, and on these trials 
participants won between 5 and 100 pence depending on the speed of their response, with 
feedback provided at the end of each trial. On rewarded trials where participants either 
made no response or responded after the probe had disappeared, the message “Missed: 5 
pence” was displayed. If participants responded prematurely (<100ms after the onset of 
the probe), the message displayed was “Too early: 5 pence”. On rewarded trials where 
participants responded before the probe disappeared, but slower than their mean RT, the 
message “Hit – good: 10 pence” was displayed. When participants responded more 
quickly than their mean RT, the message “Quick – very good: X pence” was displayed 
(for responses up to 1.5 SDFs faster than their mean RT) and “Very quick– excellent: X 
pence” (for responses faster than their mean RT by at least 1.5 SDFs). The reward was 
scaled according to X = 10 + 90 x (practice mean RT – trial RT)/(3 x SDF), up to a 
maximum of 100 pence. For example, a response 1 SDF faster than the mean was 
rewarded with 40 pence, a response 2 SDFs faster was rewarded with 70 pence, and any 
responses 3 SDFs or faster than the mean were rewarded with 100 pence. On the 50% of 
trials that were not rewarded, the message “Sorry – no money available” was displayed, 
regardless of the speed of response. 
The likelihood of reward on a given trial was signalled by one of four categories of cues 
that appeared on-screen before the onset of the probe. The cues varied on two different 
visual dimensions: colour (blue or red) and shape (animal or household object). 
Therefore, there were four different types of cue: blue animals; red animals; blue 
household objects and red household objects. Each cue set consisted of 16 different 
pictures, each of which was presented once per block. One of the cue dimensions (e.g. 
‘colour’) was task-relevant, so that one level of the dimension was rewarded on 28/32 of 
the trials (e.g. reward on 14/16 ‘blue animal’ and 14/16 ‘blue household object’ trials, 
corresponding to 87.5% of all ‘blue’ trials), while only 4/32 trials of the other level were 
rewarded (e.g. red on 2/16 ‘red animal’ and 2/16 ‘red household object’ trials, 
corresponding to 12.5% of all ‘red’ trials). The other dimension (in this example ‘shape’) 
was task-irrelevant, so that reward occurred on 16/32 trials of both levels of the 
dimension (in this example corresponding to 50% of all ‘animal’ and 50% of all 
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‘household object’ trials). Participants were not informed of these contingencies. Three 
blocks of 64 trials were performed, with identical reward contingencies on each block of 
the game. The task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions were counterbalanced across 
subjects (see below). 
Trial structure (Figure 1) 
At the beginning of each trial a fixation-cross appeared. After 1 second, while the 
fixation-cross remained on-screen, one of the four cues was displayed at the left and right 
of the screen and remained on-screen until the end of the trial. After a period of time that 
varied randomly across trials (between 3.5 and 4.5 seconds) the probe appeared, replacing 
the fixation-cross, and participants attempted to respond before it disappeared using the 
index finger of their right hand on an MRI compatible button-box. The onset of the probe 
was therefore unpredictable, ensuring that participants were unable to anticipate its 
appearance. The duration of the probe also varied randomly across trials, and was 
calibrated for each participant separately from their own practice session data, with limits 
2 SDFs either side of the practice mean RT. After 2.25 seconds feedback was presented 
for 1.5 seconds as described above. On rewarded trials, a tone with frequency 
proportional to the amount of money won on that trial sounded at feedback. After 
feedback, a blank screen of variable duration was inserted to result in a constant inter-trial 
interval of 9.25 seconds. 
Four different versions of the SAT were used, counter-balanced across participants, each 
with a different stimulus feature (blue, red, animal or household object) rewarded with 
high probability. Each participant was administered the same version for each block of 
the SAT. At the end of each block, participants indicated, using 100 mm visual analogue 
scales (VAS), their estimate of the reward probabilities for each of the four different cues, 
ranging from 0% (never associated with money) to 100% (always associated with 
money), such that 1 mm corresponded to 1%. 
Outcome variables 
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Measures of reward learning were calculated for each block according to VAS ratings 
and RTs. Adaptive reward learning was defined as the increase in probability rating (the 
explicit measure of adaptive reward learning), or speeding of responses (the implicit 
measure of adaptive reward learning), for high-probability reward trials relative to low-
probability reward trials (e.g. ‘blue’ relative to ‘red’ in the above example). Aberrant 
reward learning was defined as the absolute difference in VAS rating (the explicit 
measure of aberrant reward learning) or RT (the implicit measure of aberrant reward 
learning) between the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g. the 
unsigned difference between ‘animal’ and ‘household object’ in the above example). The 
number of premature responses and omissions were also recorded for each stimulus type 
on each block.  
MRI image acquisition 
Blood-oxygen-dependent level (BOLD) responses were measured while participants 
performed the SAT using a 3 Tesla head scanner (Magnetom Allegra, Siemens Medical, 
Erlangen, Germany) operated with its standard head transmit-receive coil. We acquired 
gradient-echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPI) utilizing a single-shot gradient-
echo sequence optimized to reduce signal dropout in the orbitofrontal cortex (Weiskopf et 
al., 2006). Forty-two oblique transverse slices of 2 mm thickness and a 1 mm gap 
between slices were acquired with 3 mm in-plane resolution; repetition time (TR) = 2.73 
s; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; bandwidth (BW) = 3551 Hz/pixel; bandwidth in phase 
encoding direction (BWPE) = 47.3 Hz/pixel; phase encoding direction = anterior-
posterior; field of view (FOV) = 192x192 mm2; matrix size 64x64 with fat suppression. 
BOLD sensitivity losses in the orbitofrontal cortex due to susceptibility artifacts were 
minimized by applying a z-shim gradient moment of -2 mT/m lasting 1 ms, with a slice 
tilt of -30o to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line and a positive PE 
gradient polarity (Weiskopf et al., 2006). EPI magnitude images were reconstructed from 
the complex k-space raw data using a generalized reconstruction method based on the 
measured EPI k-space trajectory to minimize ghosting. EPI data acquisition was 
monitored on-line using a real-time reconstruction and quality assurance system 
(Weiskopf et al., 2007). The first five images in each series were discarded to allow for 
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T1 saturation. T1-weighted structural scans were also acquired for each participant, with 
resolution 1 mm3; TR = 7.92 ms; TE = 2.4 ms; TI = 910 ms; BW = 195 Hz/Px; α = 15°. 
fMRI analysis 
EPI data were analyzed using an event-related design with Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM5 – www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Briefly, after discarding the first five images of 
each session to allow for T1 saturation, the remaining images were unwarped and 
realigned to the sixth image in the series, spatially normalized to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) template and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel at 8 mm full 
half-width maximum (FWHM). Maximum likelihood parameter estimates were 
calculated at each voxel using the general linear model and an AR(1) model of serial 
correlations. In this model, four ‘cue’ regressors, representing the different cue types, an 
‘outcome’ regressor representing the outcome of each trial and its parametric modulation 
according to reinforcement magnitude (0-100 pence), were created by convolving the 
onset of each event (duration 2 s for cue regressors, 1.5 s for outcome regressors) with a 
set of temporal basis functions (see below). Cues on which participants failed to respond 
entirely were excluded from the analysis, due to the possibility that participants were not 
attending during the trial. However, the outcomes on these trials were modelled, since the 
pitch of the tone played during feedback would alert participants to the magnitude of the 
reward, even if their eyes were closed. Trials on which participants responded extremely 
prematurely (<1250ms) were also excluded, so as to avoid contaminating the 
measurement of cue-associated responses with movement-associated responses, though 
outcomes on these trials were modelled. Reaction times were modelled implicitly via 
parametric modulation by reinforcement magnitude (see above); since reward magnitude 
was dependent on reaction time, an additional regressor of reaction times would have 
resulted in very highly correlated regressors, drastically reducing statistical efficiency. To 
account for inter-regional and inter-subject variability in the shape of the hemodynamic 
response function (HRF), we used a set of temporal basis functions that included a 
canonical HRF as well as its temporal and dispersion derivatives. The model additionally 
included drift terms up to 1/128 Hz to remove low-frequency components, and global 
confounds were removed using global normalization. 
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At the first (within-subject) level, three contrast images were generated per participant, 
representing:  
• Parametrically modulated reward delivery 
• Adaptive reward prediction responses (high-probability reward cue features minus 
low-probability reward cue features across the task-relevant dimension – e.g. 
‘blue’ cues minus ‘red’ cues) 
• Aberrant reward prediction responses (subjective ‘high-probability’ reward cue 
features minus subjective ‘low-probability’ reward cue features across the task-
irrelevant dimension – e.g. ‘animal’ cues minus ‘household object’ cues) 
To calculate the aberrant reward prediction contrast images, subjective ‘high-probability’ 
and ‘low-probability’ cue types were defined for each block separately on the basis of 
each participant’s VAS ratings (i.e. the direction of the explicit measure of aberrant 
reward learning). So if in the above example a subject had rated the animal cues as 
having a higher reward probability than household object cues in a particular block, all 
animal stimuli were defined as ‘high’-probability for that block in the aberrant reward 
prediction contrast. 
Following first-level analysis, the contrast images of each participant were checked 
manually to ensure accurate normalization to the MNI template, and to exclude 
participants with corrupted images or artefacts resulting from excessive head-movement. 
This led to the exclusion of 4 participants from the group-level analyses. The contrast 
images from the remaining 19 participants were subjected to analysis at the group level 
using the summary statistics approach to random-effects analyses. 
Three random-effects group-level analyses were performed, each entailing a one-sample 
t-test on the contrast images from the contrasts listed above. To examine the effects of 
inter-individual differences in reward learning we included the explicit measures of 
adaptive and aberrant reward learning, assessed by VAS ratings and averaged over all 
three blocks, as explanatory variables in the (second and third) t-tests of the 
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corresponding hemodynamic responses. These maps were thresholded at an uncorrected 
level of p=0.001 
We were particularly interested in exploring responses in the ventral striatum and MD 
thalamus, since these regions have previously been implicated in reward processing 
(Knutson et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006) and are innervated by dopamine (Brown et 
al., 1979; Knutson et al., 2004; Sanchez-Gonzalez et al., 2005; Garcia-Cabezas et al., 
2007). For analysis of responses in the ventral striatum for the adaptive and aberrant 
reward prediction contrasts, we defined spheres of radius 8 mm as volumes of interest 
(VOIs) centred on the peak-voxels identified by the orthogonal analysis of parametric 
modulation of reward outcome (right: [x=15; y=18; z=-6]; left: [x=-9; y=12; z=-3]). For 
analysis of responses in the MD thalamus for the covariate analyses, we defined a sphere 
of radius 8 mm as a VOI centred on the peak-voxel identified in the analysis of adaptive 
reward prediction (right: [x=3; y=-9; z=9]; left: [x=-3; y=-9; z=9]). Note that in both 
cases the contrast used to define the VOI was orthogonal to the contrast of interest. 
We discuss all effects surviving either voxel-level or cluster-level family-wise error 
(FWE) correction for whole-brain multiple comparisons (WBC), or small-volume 
corrected (SVC) voxel-level FWE correction for multiple comparisons across the VOIs 
defined above. For completeness we list all clusters comprising 10 contiguous voxels at a 
t-threshold of p<0.001 (uncorrected) in Tables S1-S3. Anatomical localization was 
performed with reference to the atlas of Mai et al (2003), after transforming MNI co-
ordinates to the stereotaxic space of Talairach and Tournoux (http://imaging.mrc-
cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach). Sub-regions of the ventral PFC were identified as 
described in Ongur et al (2003). 
Behavioral data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS 16, SPSS Inc., Chicago). Acquisition of reward contingencies was assessed using 
a one-sample t-test against zero on the adaptive reward learning measures. Effects of 
block on adaptive and aberrant reward learning, omission errors, premature responses and 
earnings were assessed using repeated-measures analysis of variance, with block (one, 
two or three) and probability (high or low) as the within-subjects factor where 
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appropriate; the Huynh-Feldt correction was employed where significant non-sphericity 
was detected. 
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RESULTS 
Behaviour on the SAT 
Probability rating data acquired at the end of each block suggested that participants were 
able to acquire the stimulus-reward associations effectively, though not perfectly. 
Probability ratings were significantly higher for high-probability reward cues relative to 
low-probability reward cues (t(18)=6.7, p<0.000001; mean explicit measure of adaptive 
reward learning: 31.2 mm (SD 20.2 mm)). The explicit measure of adaptive reward 
learning progressed significantly over the course of the task (probability x block 
interaction: F(1.6, 28.4)=9.7, p<0.005, ε=0.79). The mean explicit measure of aberrant 
reward learning (i.e. the absolute difference in probability rating between the two levels 
of the irrelevant stimulus dimension) was 11.2 mm (SD 9.1 mm), but the explicit measure 
of aberrant reward learning did not change significantly over the course of the task (main 
effect of block: F(2, 36)=1.6, p>0.1).  
RT data acquired during the task confirmed that participants were able to use the reward 
associations to guide their responding adaptively, as reported previously (Roiser et al., 
2009). Following the exclusion of an outlier who scored 3.5 SDs lower than the rest of 
the group on the implicit adaptive reward learning measure, participants responded 
significantly more quickly on high- relative to low-probability trials (t(17)=2.2, p=0.046; 
mean implicit measure of adaptive reward learning: 6.5 ms (SD 12.7 ms)), though the 
implicit measure of adaptive reward learning did not change significantly over the course 
of the task (probability x block interaction: F<1). Mean implicit aberrant reward learning 
(i.e. the absolute difference in RT between the two levels of the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension) was 15.7 ms (SD 8.5 ms), and also did not change significantly over the 
course of the task (main effect of block: F(2, 36)=1.8, p>0.1). Participants responded 
with similar speed on trial-types subsequently rated as ‘high’-probability reward on the 
task-irrelevant dimension (mean 292.8 ms (SD 24.6 ms)) relative to those subsequently 
rated as ‘low’-probability reward (mean 293.6 ms (SD 21.0 ms)) (t(18)<1). 
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The explicit measure of adaptive reward learning correlated significantly with the  
implicit measure of adaptive reward learning (r=0.58, p=0.010), though the implicit and 
explicit aberrant reward learning measures were uncorrelated (r=-0.145, p=0.55). 
Adaptive and aberrant reward learning measures were uncorrelated, both for the implicit 
(r=-0.130, p=0.61) and explicit (r=0.333, p=0.18) measures. 
The amount of money won per rewarded trial was significantly higher on high-
probability reward trials (N=28 per block, mean £0.22 (SD £0.05) per reward) relative to 
low-probability reward trials (N=4 per block, mean £0.18 (SD £0.07) per reward) 
(t(18)=2.2, p=0.042), again suggesting that the cue-reward associations influenced 
participants’ responding. However, participants won similar amounts of money per trial 
on trial-types subsequently rated as ‘high’-probability reward on the task-irrelevant 
stimulus dimension (N=16 per block, mean £0.22 (SD £0.06) per reward) relative to 
those subsequently rated as ‘low’-probability reward (N=16 per block, mean £0.21 (SD 
£0.05) per reward) (t(18)=1.1, p=0.3). Overall, participants won an average of £6.76 (SD 
£0.36) per block, with more money won on later blocks (main effect of block: 
F(2,36)=11.2, p<0.001), again suggestive of learning over the course of the task. Notably, 
participants’ average response time did not vary significantly over blocks (F(2,36)=2.2, 
p=0.13), suggesting that this increase in earnings was not simply related to an overall 
speeding of responses on later blocks. Across participants, the explicit measure of 
adaptive reward learning showed a trend towards correlating with the total amount money 
won (r=0.41, p=0.08). However, neither IQ not digit span correlated significantly with 
any measure of reward learning (either implicit or explicit measures: r<0.3, p>0.25 in all 
cases). 
Participants made an average of 2.7 (SD 2.0) premature responses per block and 4.5 (SD 
5.2) omissions per block, with no difference between high- and low-probability rewarded 
trials and no main effect of block (p>0.1 for all). 
fMRI data 
Parametric modulation of reinforcement outcome 
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As expected, parametric modulation of reward outcome yielded robust hemodynamic 
responses in the ventral striatum, which survived whole-brain FWE correction at both the 
voxel-level (p=0.0001 (WBC)) and the cluster-level (p=5x10-16 (WBC)), suggesting that 
increasing monetary gain robustly engaged the brain’s reward system in a parametric 
fashion. Parametric modulation of reward outcome also yielded responses in a number of 
ventral PFC structures, including pre-genual cingulate, lateral PFC and lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, as well as bilateral inferior temporal gyrus, left pre-central gyrus and 
right supra-marginal gyrus, all of which survived whole-brain FWE correction at the 
cluster-level (see Table S1 for full list of co-ordinates). 
Adaptive reward prediction 
Contrasting the effect of presenting cue features associated with a high- relative to low- 
probability of reward revealed a network of structures, all of which survived whole-brain 
FWE correction at the cluster-level, including a large cluster in the mid-brain (the peak 
voxel of which corresponded to the ventral tegmental area: VTA) extending to bilateral 
MD thalamus (p=0.0004 (WBC)), bilateral superior temporal gyrus (right: p=0.00003 
(WBC); left: p=0.000001 (WBC)), posterior insula (p=0.021 (WBC)) and cerebellum 
(p=0.025 (WBC)), as well as bilateral ventral striatum, which survived SVC FWE 
correction at the voxel-level (right: [x=12, y=12, z=-3], p=0.023 (SVC); left [x=-12, y=9, 
z=-3], p=0.045 (SVC)) (Figure 2a; see Table S2 for a full list of co-ordinates). 
The reverse contrast revealed a network of PFC structures, all of which survived whole-
brain FWE correction at the cluster-level, including DLPFC (p=0.006 (WBC)) and lateral 
frontal pole bilaterally (right: p=0.00005 (WBC); left: p=0.001 (WBC)) (Figure 3; see 
Table S2 for a full list of co-ordinates). 
Including the explicit adaptive reward learning measure as a covariate in this analysis 
allowed the identification of regions where inter-individual differences in hemodynamic 
responses associated with adaptive reward prediction were correlated with inter-
individual variation in explicit adaptive reward learning measures. In other words, we 
could identify regions whose differential activation to high- relative to low-probability 
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cue features correlated with our explicit measure of adaptive reward learning across 
participants. This analysis revealed correlations surviving whole-brain FWE correction at 
the cluster-level in the dorsal anterior cingulate (p=0.0002 (WBC)) and precentral gyrus 
(p=0.027 (WBC)), as well as bilateral MD thalamus, which survived SVC FWE 
correction at the voxel-level (right: [x=-3, y=-12, z=15], p=0.021 (SVC); left [x=-3, y=-9, 
z=12], p=0.026 (SVC)) (Figure 2b & c; see Table S2 for a full list of co-ordinates). 
Including the implicit adaptive reward learning measure as a covariate also revealed a 
correlation in the right MD thalamus that survived SVC FWE correction at the voxel-
level ([x=3, y=-15, z=6], p=0.044 (SVC); see Table S2 for a full list of co-ordinates). 
The reverse contrast, i.e. testing for negative correlations between hemodynamic 
responses associated with adaptive reward prediction and explicit measures of adaptive 
reward learning across participants, revealed correlations surviving whole-brain FWE 
correction at the cluster-level in the occipital cortex (p=0.004 (WBC)) and left lateral 
frontal pole (overlapping with the frontopolar main effect identified above: p=0.00009 
(WBC)), as well a correlation that showed a trend towards whole-brain FWE corrected 
significance in the right frontal pole (p=0.097 (WBC)) (Figure 3b; see Table S2 for a full 
list of co-ordinates). Including the implicit adaptive reward learning measure as a 
covariate also revealed a correlation in the left lateral frontal pole that survived SVC 
FWE at the voxel-level (SVC based on a mask of the orthogonal reverse main effect at 
p<0.001 (uncorrected): [x=-24, y=54, z=18], p=0.004 (SVC); see Table S2 for a full list 
of co-ordinates). 
Aberrant reward prediction 
The contrast between subjective ‘high’- relative to subjective ‘low’-probability cue 
features (defined according to the direction of each participant’s block-specific explicit 
measure of aberrant reward learning across the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension – see 
Methods) did not reveal any effects that survived whole-brain FWE correction, either at 
the cluster-level or the voxel-level. 
 17
Roiser et al. 
However, our statistical model also included the explicit measure of aberrant reward 
learning measure as a covariate; this allowed the identification of regions where inter-
individual differences in hemodynamic responses associated with aberrant reward 
prediction were correlated with inter-individual variation in the explicit measure of 
aberrant reward learning. In other words, we could identify regions whose differential 
activation to cue features at the two levels of the irrelevant stimulus dimension, both 
associated with 50% probability of reward, correlated with our explicit measure of 
aberrant reward learning. This analysis revealed two regions that survived whole-brain 
FWE correction at the cluster-level, one in the right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) where 
responses were positively correlated with aberrant reward learning (p=0.002 (WBC)), the 
other in the left DLPFC where responses were negatively correlated with aberrant reward 
learning (p=0.043 (WBC)) (Figure 4; see Table S3 for a full list of co-ordinates). There 
were no regions where hemodynamic responses associated with aberrant reward 
prediction were significantly correlated with inter-individual variation in implicit aberrant 
reward learning measures, even at an uncorrected threshold of p<0.001, 10 contiguous 
voxels. 
DISCUSSION 
A major finding of this study was that variation across participants in aberrant reward 
learning pertaining to cues associated with identical reward probabilities was strongly 
associated with differential DLPFC and MTG responses to those stimuli. We also found, 
consistent with previous studies (Knutson et al., 2001), that presenting cues with a strong 
reward association elicited hemodynamic responses in the VTA, MD thalamus and 
ventral striatum, and that responses in the MD thalamus correlated with inter-individual 
variability in the explicit measure of adaptive reward learning. Finally, we demonstrate 
that simply presenting cues with a low relative to high probability of reward elicited 
robust hemodynamic responses in the lateral frontal pole and DLPFC, and that responses 
in the lateral frontal pole correlated negatively with inter-individual differences in the 
extent of explicit adaptive reward learning. 
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Presenting cues associated with a high probability of reward relative to those with a low 
probability of reward elicited hemodynamic responses in the midbrain (corresponding to 
the VTA), MD thalamus and ventral striatum (Figure 2a). Furthermore, the magnitude of 
hemodynamic responses in the MD thalamus was strongly correlated with the degree to 
which participants learned to distinguish the reward probabilities of the high- and low-
probability cues (Figure 2b & c). Since we did not record arterial pulsation during the 
scan we cannot exclude the possibility that the hemodynamic signal change in the 
midbrain may have been confounded by pulsation of brain stem arteries. Nevertheless, 
the location of the peak voxel identified in the midbrain corresponded to the anatomical 
location of the VTA (Mai et al., 2003), and the increased BOLD signal in the ventral 
striatum and MD thalamus, both innervated by dopamine, is consistent with an 
explanation in terms of increased input from the VTA.  
The MD thalamus, which receives afferent inputs from the ventral striatum both directly 
and indirectly via the ventral pallidum, sends efferent projections to the ventral part of the 
prefrontal cortex (Alexander et al., 1986; Lawrence et al., 1998). The ventral prefrontal 
cortex itself projects back to the ventral striatum, thus closing a circuit involved in the 
automatic processing of emotionally-relevant environmental stimuli, the ‘affective’ 
cortico-striatal-thalamic loop (Ongur and Price, 2000). Therefore, we suggest that the 
responses we identified reflect the arousing and invigorating effect of stimuli associated 
with reward, probably mediated by dopamine release in the ventral striatum (Berridge 
and Robinson, 1998). We further speculate that the MD region of the thalamus plays a 
role in orienting attention towards motivationally salient stimuli, as demonstrated in 
previous studies (Small et al., 2005), in a similar fashion to that demonstrated for the 
pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus in mediating attention towards visually salient stimuli 
(Robinson and Petersen, 1992; Morris et al., 1997). 
Presenting cues with a low probability of reward relative to those with a high probability 
of reward elicited strong responses in the lateral frontal pole (Figure 3a) and DLPFC. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of hemodynamic response in the lateral frontal pole was 
strongly correlated with the degree to which participants learned to distinguish the reward 
associations of the high-probability and low-probability cues (Figure 3b). The 
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involvement of DLPFC is consistent with previous findings implicating this region in 
associative learning (Corlett et al., 2004). Responses in the more ventral lateral frontal 
pole area have been reported during the processing of internal representations as opposed 
to external stimuli, or ‘mind-wandering’ (Christoff et al., 2004; Burgess et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, as we also found, such responses tend to occur under conditions where 
participants respond more slowly to stimuli (see Gilbert et al., 2006 for a meta-analysis). 
Responses in this region have also been reported during instrumental reinforcement 
learning when participants chose a low-probability reward stimulus over a high-
probability reward stimulus (the ‘exploratory choice’ condition in Daw et al 2006). 
However, in the present study, simply presenting low-probability reward cues was 
sufficient to elicit responses in the lateral frontal pole. 
By contrast, the presentation of cue features associated with identical reward probabilities 
(i.e. comparing the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension) did not elicit 
consistent differential responses across participants. This is perhaps unsurprising, as on 
average participants exhibited very little aberrant reward learning. However, our 
covariate analysis revealed robust relationships between the degree of aberrant reward 
learning across participants and differential responses to irrelevant cue features in the 
DLPFC and MTG. Irrelevant cue features that were erroneously inferred to be associated 
with a higher probability of reward elicited smaller DLPFC responses and greater MTG 
responses, and these differential regional responses were expressed more strongly the 
higher participants scored on the explicit aberrant reward learning measure. One 
possibility is that the responses in these regions simply reflect the erroneous prediction of 
lower vs higher reward, given that the same DLPFC region was evident in the adaptive 
reward learning contrast (see above). However, this cannot be the complete explanation 
because there was a spatial dissociation between fictitious (aberrant) and veridical 
(adaptive) reward-related responses. Aberrant reward prediction signals were not evident 
in sub-cortical regions such as striatum, thalamus and midbrain, which were apparent in 
adaptive reward learning analysis, whereas the converse was true for the MTG. This 
suggests that the processing of fictitious and veridical value is qualitatively different and 
engages distinct (if overlapping) systems. We now consider the nature of this difference. 
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Our results speak to an ongoing discussion in the literature regarding which aspects of 
stimuli drive associative learning. On the one hand, Mackintosh (1975) suggested that the 
associability of a stimulus is determined by how reliably it predicts an outcome. Thus 
highly predictive (i.e. low uncertainty) cues should be most associable, and over time 
non-predictive cues are learned to be ignored; this type of mechanism would encourage 
adaptive reward learning on the SAT. On the other hand, Pearce and Hall (1980) 
proposed that cues with uncertain consequences are most associable, more strongly 
capturing attention; such a mechanism could possibly contribute to aberrant reward 
learning on the SAT. 
One way to express uncertainty about possible outcomes is the information theoretic 
concept of entropy, which  represents the average surprise over all possible outcomes, in 
our case either presence or absence of reward (e.g. see Strange et al., 2005). On the SAT, 
the uncertainty about the outcome is equal for both ends of the task-relevant stimulus 
dimension: reward can be either present with 87.5% probability and absent with 12.5%, 
or vice versa, both corresponding to an entropy of 0.377. Contrasting these cue features 
revealed robust responses in a well-characterised circuit innervated by dopaminergic 
projections as described above, suggesting an important role for the affective cortico-
striatal loop in associative learning from predictable cues (Mackintosh, 1975).  
On the other hand, the two ends of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension on the SAT are 
both associated with a highly uncertain indication of reward outcome (50% probability, 
corresponding to a maximal entropy of 0.693). According to the Pearce-Hall (1980) 
model, these cue features should be highly associable. When probing aberrant reward 
learning by comparing the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension, we did 
not find any significant responses across the group as a whole; however, we did observe 
significant correlations between the degree of aberrant reward learning and responses to 
irrelevant cues in DLPFC and MTG. These regions have both previously been reported to 
be sensitive to changes in uncertainty (represented by entropy: Bischoff-Grethe et al., 
2000). Therefore, the correlations we observed across participants between responses in 
these regions and the degree of aberrant reward learning might reflect individual 
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preferences in how uncertain cues are evaluated (see also Huettel et al., 2006; Chew et 
al., 2008). 
It should be noted that this somewhat speculative interpretation also implies that the 
activations we found for adaptive reward learning should reflect associative learning 
under low uncertainty. Some of these regions, however, were previously reported to 
correlate positively with the uncertainty of reward outcome (Fiorillo et al., 2003; 
Preuschoff et al., 2006). This apparent contradiction may be related to the fact that these 
previous studies assessed responses during a delay period immediately preceding reward 
delivery, while we modelled responses to the cue stimulus itself. Perhaps even more 
importantly, in these previous studies the probability distribution of outcomes was known 
to the subjects (due to overtraining or instruction, respectively) whereas in our study it 
was not (c.f. the distinction between "risk" and "ambiguity" in the economics literature: 
Camerer and Weber, 1992; Huettel et al., 2006). 
In summary, we demonstrate that the extent of aberrant reward learning across 
individuals is strongly associated with the magnitude of differential MTG and DLPFC 
responses to cues erroneously inferred to differ in terms reward-association. By contrast, 
adaptive reward prediction responses were identified in a network of structures including 
regions of the thalamus, striatum and prefrontal cortex comprising the ‘affective’ cortico-
striatal loop. Following this initial study in healthy volunteers, it will be important in 
future work to assess the neural mechanisms underpinning aberrant reward processing in 
patients with psychosis, since maladaptive reinforcement signalling has been posited as a 
central mechanism underlying psychotic symptoms (Kapur, 2003; Jensen et al., 2008; 
Murray et al., 2008). In particular, it will be of interest to test whether DLPFC and MTG 
responses to irrelevant cues during aberrant reward learning correlate with the severity of 
psychotic symptoms. 
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LEGENDS TO FIGURES 
Figure 1 – Salience Attribution Test. Participants were required to respond to the 
square as quickly as possible. On 50% of trials, participants won more money for quicker 
responses, with the probability of reward signalled by the cue appearing immediately 
prior to the probe. 
Figure 2 – Hemodynamic responses associated with high- relative to low-probability 
reward cues. Presenting cues associated with a high- relative to low-probability of 
reinforcement elicited responses bilaterally in the ventral striatum (peak co-ordinates: 
right [x=12, y=12, z=-3]; left [x=-12, y=9, z=-3]) (a) and medial dorsal thalamus (peak 
co-ordinates: right [x=3, y=-9, z=9]; left [x=-3, y=-9, z=9]) (b). Responses in the 
thalamus were strongly correlated with the degree of explicit adaptive reward learning 
across participants (peak co-ordinates: right [x=6, y=-12, z=15]; left [x=-3, y=-12, z=15], 
r=0.71 (plotted in scatterplot)) (c). 
Figure 3 – Hemodynamic responses associated with low- relative to high-probability 
reward cues. (a) Presenting cues associated with a low- relative to high-probability of 
reinforcement elicited responses in the lateral frontal pole bilaterally (peak co-ordinates: 
right [x=24, y=54, z=6]; left [x=-21, y=63, z=12])), which were strongly correlated with 
the degree of explicit adaptive reward learning across participants (peak co-ordinates: 
right [x=9, y=69, z=6]; left [x=-27, y=48, z=18], r=-0.80 (plotted in scatterplot)) (b). 
Figure 4 – Hemodynamic responses associated with explicit aberrant reward 
learning. Differential response to two cues associated with equal (50%) probability of 
reward in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (peak co-ordinates: left [x=-18, y=45, z=36]) 
(a) was strongly correlated with the degree of explicit aberrant reward learning pertaining 
to those stimuli across participants (r=-0.82) (b). 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2a-c 
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Figure 3a&b 
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Figure 4a&b 
 
 
Roiser et al. Supplementary Online Materials 
Table S1 – Regions identified by parametric modulation of reward outcome. 
Region Right/left MNI co-ordinates Cluster size1 Z value 
 X Y Z  
R 15 18 -6 589† 5.89*Ventral striatum 
Ventral striatum L -9 12 3 4.81*
Inferior temporal gyrus L -54 -54 -18 38† 5.08*
Inferior temporal gyrus R 57 -48 -18 24 4.80*
Pre-genual cingulate M 3 45 12 312† 4.49
Lateral prefrontal cortex R 54 36 24 84† 4.46
Supra-marginal gyrus L -51 -42 48 18 4.29
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex R 45 48 -12 56† 4.26
Cerebellum L -6 -81 -33 18 4.25
Insula R 48 9 33 35 4.08
Pre-central gyrus L -45 3 33 38† 3.99
Supra-marginal gyrus R 48 -51 54 53† 3.95
Superior temporal gyrus R 66 -36 0 24 3.72
Supra-marginal gyrus R 54 -36 57 11 3.62
Medial temporal gyrus R 60 -33 -9 10 3.52
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L -48 42 12 12 3.36
 Coordinates correspond to MNI space and denote the distance in mm from the anterior commissure, with positive x = right of 
midline, positive y = anterior to the anterior commissure, and positive z = dorsal to a plane containing both the anterior and the 
posterior commissures.  
Abbreviations: L – left; M – midline; R – right; 1 Corresponds to a threshold of p<0.001 (uncorrected), minimum cluster-size 10 
voxels. * Survives whole-brain family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons at the voxel-level; † Survives whole-brain 
family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons at the cluster-level. 
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Table S2 – Regions identified by the contrast of high- relative to low-probability CS presentation (adaptive reward prediction). 
 Right/left MNI co-ordinates Cluster size1 Z value 
High minus low probability X Y Z  
Superior temporal gyrus L -63 -24 12 209† 4.60
L -9 -27 -9 108† 4.46
R 3 -9 9 3.55
Midbrain (VTA) 
Medial dorsal thalamus 
Medial dorsal thalamus L -3 -9 9 3.71
Posterior insula L -39 -18 -9 52† 4.42
Superior temporal gyrus R 66 -30 12 151† 4.01
Cerebellum R 6 -63 -15 50† 3.75
Ventral striatum R 12 12 -3 6 3.35#
Ventral striatum L -12 9 -3 1 3.10#
Low minus high probability  
Polar prefrontal cortex  L -21 63 12 90† 4.66
Polar prefrontal cortex  R 24 54 6 139† 4.51
Inferior temporal gyrus R 36 15 -36 23 4.48
DLPFC (superior frontal gyrus) L -24 36 45 69† 3.83
Posterior cingulate cortex R 12 -48 36 30 3.71
Supra-marginal gyrus R 48 -60 36 37 3.47
Positive covariation with adaptive learning 
(explicit)  
Dorsal anterior cingulate M 0 9 48 113† 4.55
Premotor cortex M -3 3 69 10 4.11
Precentral gyrus L -39 -12 51 47† 3.99
Cerebellum M 0 -30 -39 15 3.87
Motor cortex R 39 -6 51 29 3.85
Superior parietal lobe R 33 -48 45 10 3.73
Premotor cortex R 15 -3 63 12 3.55
Medial dorsal thalamus R 6 -12 15 4 3.14#
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Medial dorsal thalamus L -3 -12 15 4 3.41#
Positive covariation with adaptive learning 
(implicit)  
Occipital cortex R 21 -90 9 16 4.46
Occipital cortex R 3 -72 18 36 4.02
Medial dorsal thalamus R 3 -15 6 1 3.12#
Negative covariation with adaptive learning 
(explicit)  
Occipital cortex L -30 -66 -3 71† 4.72
Polar prefrontal cortex R 9 69 6 33 4.39
Inferior temporal gyrus R 45 6 -42 20 4.09
Polar prefrontal cortex L -27 48 18 124† 4.08
Occipital cortex R 21 -90 24 31 4.03
Cerebellum L -30 -75 -42 20 3.74
Precuneus M 3 -60 27 11 3.60
Parahippocampal gyrus L -27 -39 -18 10 3.60
Negative covariation with adaptive learning 
(implicit)  
Polar prefrontal cortex L -24 54 18 31 4.33#
Parahippocampal gyrus L -18 -39 -9 23 4.08
Fusiform gyrus L -33 -54 -3 10 4.07
Middle temporal gyrus R 57 3 -21 23 3.82
Fusiform gyrus R 33 -42 -12 33 3.8
Parietal/occipital transition zone L -36 -84 33 17 3.76
Parietal/occipital transition zone R 33 -81 42 33 3.7
 Coordinates correspond to MNI space and denote the distance in mm from the anterior commissure, with positive x = right of 
midline, positive y = anterior to the anterior commissure, and positive z = dorsal to a plane containing both the anterior and the 
posterior commissures. 
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Abbreviations: L – left; M – midline; R – right; VTA – ventral tegmental area; DLPFC – dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 1 Corresponds 
to a threshold of p<0.001 (uncorrected), minimum cluster-size 10 voxels. † Survives whole-brain family-wise error correction for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster-level. # Survives small-volume adjusted family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons at 
the voxel-level. 
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Table S3 – regions identified by the contrast of subjective ‘high’- relative to subjective ‘low’-probability CS presentation 
(aberrant reward prediction). 
 Right/left MNI co-ordinates Cluster size1 Z value 
Subjective ‘high’ minus ‘low’ probability X Y Z  
Superior temporal gyrus R 54 -42 24 14 4.25
Post-central gyrus R 54 -24 24 14 3.90
Subjective ‘low’ minus ‘high’ probability  
No clusters survive threshold  
Positive covariation with aberrant learning 
(explicit)  
Primary visual cortex R 18 -84 6 18 4.42
Cerebellum R 18 -54 -33 23 4.11
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex R 24 36 12 18 4.08
Inferior temporal gyrus R 39 -54 -21 24 3.91
Cerebellum M 3 -63 -39 21 3.80
Middle temporal gyrus R 48 -66 12 67† 3.78
Orbitofrontal cortex R 21 27 0 16 3.63
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L -21 36 9 10 3.62
Positive covariation with aberrant learning 
(implicit)  
No clusters survive threshold  
Negative covariation with aberrant learning 
(explicit)  
DLPFC (superior frontal gyrus) L -18 45 36 35† 4.28
DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus)2 L -33 21 51 16 3.92
Fusiform gyrus L -33 -60 -6 12 3.74
Negative covariation with aberrant learning 
(implicit)  
No clusters survive threshold  
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 Coordinates correspond to MNI space and denote the distance in mm from the anterior commissure, with positive x = right of 
midline, positive y = anterior to the anterior commissure, and positive z = dorsal to a plane containing both the anterior and the 
posterior commissures. 
Abbreviations: L – left; M – midline; R – right; DLPFC – dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 1 Corresponds to a threshold of p<0.001 
(uncorrected), minimum cluster-size 10 voxels. 2 A similar effect was also detected in the right DLPFC [x=45, y=27, z=33], but the 
cluster did not survive the extent threshold. † Survives whole-brain family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons at the 
cluster-level. 
